Managing Nuclear Wastes: An Overview of the Issues by Cummings, R. G. & Utton, Albert E.
Volume 21 
Issue 4 Symposium on the Management of Nuclear Wastes 
Fall 1981 
Managing Nuclear Wastes: An Overview of the Issues 
R. G. Cummings 
Albert E. Utton 
Recommended Citation 
R. G. Cummings & Albert E. Utton, Managing Nuclear Wastes: An Overview of the Issues, 21 Nat. 
Resources J. 693 (1981). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol21/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more 
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu. 
MANAGING NUCLEAR WASTES:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES
R. G. CUMMINGS and ALBERT E. UTTON
The primary purpose of this special symposium is to set out the
broad range of issues relevant for a problem that is, and will likely con-
tinue to be, of particular importance to our society-the management
of nuclear wastes. In setting out these issues, the intent is to illumi-
nate the present state of the arts for assessing policy alternatives rele-
vant for the management of nuclear wastes, thereby identifying pol-
icy questions and trade-offs which may warrant priority in terms of
future research concerning this important management problem.
The need for a critical overview of research priorities concerning
nuclear waste management (NWM) arises as a result of the confound-
ing uncertainties inherent to NWM problems. There are uncertainties
surrounding the scope of the problem; for example, away-from-reac-
tor storage capacities for 560 metric tons of nuclear wastes will be
required by 1983 according to a DOE estimate while the GAO's esti-
mate is but 152 metric tons for 1983.1 There are uncertainties con-
cerning the nature of the NWM problem; for example, considerable
controversy exists as to the extent of dangers to public health and
safety associated with the transport (and storage2 ) of nuclear wastes:
could accidents result in nuclear explosions, tens, or hundreds, of
fatalities?3 Moreover, there are uncertainties as to the best way to
store nuclear wastes,4 how one best prepares for any waste-related
emergency,' who is liable for effects from any waste-related acci-
dent 6 (and the role of the NRC in this regard 7), as well as to how one
1. See B. Cohen, High Level Radioactive Waste, 21 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 703
(1981).
2. See, for example, S. E. LOGAN, DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF RISK
ASSESSMENT METHOD FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, REPORT NE-44
(77)-EPA-394-1 (Bureau of Engineering Research, University of New Mexico, March, 1978).
3. See R. G. CUMMINGS, et al. THE PROPOSED WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PROJ-
ECT AND IMPACTS IN THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, EMD 2-67-1139, 713-714 (New
Mexico Energy Research and Development Institute, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April
1981); see, also Norton, Policy Issues in the Routing of Radioactive Materials Shipments,
21 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 735 (1981).
4. See Cohen, supra note 1.
5. See Church and Norton, Issues in Emergency Preparedness for Radiological Transpor-
tation Accidents, 21 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 757 (1981).
6. See L. Cohen, Who Pays the Bill: Insuring Against the Risks from Low Level Nuclear
Waste Disposal, 21 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 773 (1981).
7. See Quirk and Terasawa, Nuclear Regulation: an Historical Perspective, 21 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 833 (1981).
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evaluates potential impacts on future generations from nuclear waste
management policies adopted at this point in time.8
Indeed, uncertainty is the aspect of the nuclear waste management
problem that sets it apart from the bulk of policy issues confronted
by the government, and may be viewed as the unifying theme for the
papers in this volume. In these terms, Professor Bernard Cohen's
paper may be viewed as representative of the position taken by many
physical scientists regarding nuclear waste management, that uncer-
tainties concerning NWM are few and that, in any case, threats to
public health and safety from nuclear waste disposal pale in signifi-
cance when compared with analogous threats associated with the use
of coal and the disposal of wastes from burned coal. To some extent,
Cohen's argument parallels those by other scientists who argue that
the major cause for public concern regarding the use of nuclear
power and nuclear waste disposal options is a break-down in commu-
nications between the scientific community and the general public-
i.e., the public simply doesn't understand the issues involved and the
relative safety of nuclear options. Thus, Hammond observes that
"the early developers of nuclear power had three failings-they knew
too much about radioactivity, not enough about geology, and almost
nothing about dealing with the public and its reactions." 9 As to the
relative safety of nuclear power, a 1978 study of risk in energy gen-
eration systems (including solar, wind, ocean, thermal, methanol,
coal, oil and nuclear) concluded that nuclear power, including waste
disposal, along with natural gas, is associated with less risk to public
health and safety-on the order of 100 times less risk-than any of
the other technologies considered.' 0
As suggested in Professor Burness's paper, however, the preceding
line of argument is viewed by many as sanguine, at best. Here it is
argued that uncertainty-undefined, non-quantifiable risk-shrouds
the NWM issue and that it is impossible to remove this uncertainty'1
This conclusion rests on the following arguments. Risk analyses for
nuclear related activities are based on "fault tree" analyses wherein
the analyst must attempt to set out all possible types of system fail-
ures or accidents. The following criticisms immediately arise:
8. See Schulze, Brookshire, and Sandier, The Social Rate of Discount for Nuclear Waste
Storage: Economics or Ethics?, 21 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 811 (1981).
9. Hammond, Nuclear Wastes and Public Acceptance, 67 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 146
(1979).
10. H. Inhaber, RISK OF ENERGY PRODUCTION (Atomic Energy Control Board,
Ottawa, Canada, March, 1978).
11. For an elaboration of this argument beyond that given in the Burness paper, see
Cummings, note 3, supra, Chapter VIII.
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... the analyst essentially is required to imagine that which has
never been experienced before.' 2
it is very rare that actual system failures are found to be due to hard-
ware failures (i.e., the failure modes that are usually considered in
fault-tree analysis). The cause of failure usually turns out to be one
that.., the analyst would have a very hard time imagining-like a
specific design error or human error.'
Weaknesses in risk assessments based on fault tree studies related
to the impossibility of one "imagining" all sources for, particularly,
human or design error are succinctly stated in the conclusions of a
study prepared by the Massachusetts Commission on Nuclear Safety:
If one could identify all of the possible chains of events that could
lead to a given category of release of radioactivity and could asso-
ciate a probability of occurrence with each event in these many
chains, one could, in principle, calculate the probability of the re-
lease in question. In practice, this cannot be done in a rigorous fash-
ion. The probability that a piece of equipment, or an operator, will
fail to perform satisfactorily can be estimated only approximately,
based on a combination of actual plant experience and experience
with similar equipment (and/or men) in other situations. Far more
troublesome is the fact that it will be impossible to anticipate all the
possible chain of events that might lead ultimately to a release of
14given characteristics...
While serious accidents in the use of nuclear power or in the dispo-
sition of nuclear waste have not occurred, criticism of risk analysis
based on fault tree approaches of the type cited above cannot be
summarily dismissed. An example of a potentially dangerous mishap
resulting from human error-unanticipated in a fault tree analyses-is
the well known Brown's Ferry incident. An example involving design
error is the Three Mile Island (TMI) incident. A malfunction of the
type that occurred at TMI was evaluated via fault tree analysis and
assigned a very small occurrence probability. The ex ante fault tree
analysis was based on a Westinghouse design, however, whereas the
TMI reactor was actually a Babcock-Wilson design. Following the
TMI incident, the risk of this type of malfunction was analyzed using
the correct, Babcock-Wilson design and the odds of such a malfunc-
12. Zeckhauser, Procedures for Valuing Lives, PUBLIC POLICY, 23(4), Fall, 1975, p.
445.
13. Apostolakis, Probability and Risk Assessment: The Subjectivistic Viewpoint and
Some Suggestions, 19 NUCLEAR SAFETY 313 (May-June 1978).
14. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, MASSACHUSETTS COMMIS-
SION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY (Boston, September, 1975).
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tion were shown to be much higher (1 out of 16 reactor years accord-
ing to Epps' I 5) than the earlier estimate.
The implications of the above described dilemma for policy re-
search concerning NWT are clear. Fault tree analysis is the only via-
ble tool for scientific studies of risk associated with the transporta-
tion and storage of nuclear wastes.1 6 However diligent the efforts of
scientists in these studies, risk assessments for alternative policies
associated with nuclear waste management cannot dispel the uncer-
tainty surrounding the risk of such policies inasmuch as the potential
for "unimagined" accidents resulting from design/human error will
always remain. Since, for any analysis of risk associated with a NWM
policy option, one can always imagine a set of events leading to ser-
ious accidents which were not included in the fault tree study, the
potential for highly charged controversy concerning any NWM policy
is simply unavoidable-objective means for quelling fear (Dupont's
"nuclear phobia'' 7 ) do not exist.' 8
The uncertainty theme continues with Professor Norton's discus-
sion of policy issues related to the transport of nuclear wastes. Here
attention is focused on three particularly important issues: the poten-
tial consequences of radiological transportation accidents, the appro-
priate mode of transport (road vs. rail) and the use of special trains.
Professor Norton concludes that consequences of a transportation
accident could well involve tens of fatalities, but hundreds are un-
likely in the absence of sabotage, and nuclear explosions would not
result from such accidents. Interesting observations are offered by
Professor Norton concerning the road vs. rail controversy: while the
chance of an accident is higher for road transport than for rail trans-
port-arguing for reliance on rail options-the odds of a severe acci-
dent, involving fire with more than two hours duration, is much
higher for rail transport. Uncertainties surrounding the transport
mode issue then involve weighing accident probabilities against sever-
ity implications of accidents.
15. Epps, They Bet Your Life, THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE, Nov. 18, 1979,
at 45.
16. See, for example, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT:
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1980).
17. See NUCLEAR PHOBIA-PHOBIC THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER: A
DISCUSSION WITH R. L. DuPONT 2, THE MEDIA INSTITUTE (Wash., D. C., March,
1980).
18. Compounding these difficulties is the problem faced by laypersons in interpreting
low probability-high consequence events. In such cases, "accident probabilities are usually
not given significant weight in an individual perception ... [T] he size of the potential acci-
dent is given more weight than the probability." Starr, Rudman & Whipple, Philosophical
Basis for Risk Analysis, ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENERGY 632 (1976); see, also, Cummings,
note 3, supra, Chapter VIII.
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Uncertainty and costs are highlighted in Norton's discussion of the
special trains issue. An NRC study estimates that the cost of opera-
ting special trains for nuclear waste transport would be many-fold
higher than savings (including loss of life) from their use. Serious
questions then arise concerning methods used for valuing a life. If
dollar measures are to be the yardsticks against which policy options
are to be assessed, methods used for valuing lost lives must be defen-
sible on methodological and ethical grounds. Norton argues that such
is not the case with state of the arts methods used for valuing life, in
which case alternative frameworks are required for assessing policy
options involving potential loss of life.1 9
Based on the above, controversy centered on safety will likely be a
necessary part of any consideration of NWM policy options: there-
fore, risk minimization must be at the forefront of analyses related
to such options. The minimization of risk in nuclear waste manage-
ment is the central theme of three papers in this volume. Church and
Norton consider this issue in terms of optimal programs for emer-
gency preparedness. Two major topics included in their discussion are
problems associated with the assessment of responsibilities for such
things as evacuation and, particularly important, problems associated
with defining criteria which can be used in addressing the question of
how safe is safe enough? This question is of paramount importance in
determining the scale of emergency preparedness programs, e.g.,
training of public safety officers, emergency radiological equipment,
hospital staffing and facilities, highway upgrading, etc. Church and
Norton raise provocative questions as to the usefulness of standard,
benefit-cost analyses in addressing the "how much" question related
to emergency preparedness programs. Paralleling our earlier discus-
sion of risk per se, the issue here is the appropriateness of comparing
dollar costs for emergency preparedness programs with surrogate
measures, in dollars, for loss of life.
The issue of minimizing potential damages associated with nuclear
waste transport and storage is expanded in Professor Hageman's anal-
yses concerning effects on property values. While Professor Hageman
finds little available evidence that would support the notion that
property values are adversely affected by proximity to waste disposal
sites or transport routes, she does point to trends that suggest that
such effects may become important as disposal sites increase in num-
19. The "how safe is safe enough?" issue is given an interesting treatment in R. C.
SCHEWING and W. A. ALBERS (editors), Societal Risk Assessment (Plenum Press, New
York 1980); see also, the initial issue (Vol. 1, No. 1) of the journal, RISK ANALYSIS
(Plenum Press, March, 1981), particularly the paper by Graham and Vaupel, Value of a Life:
What Difference Does It Make," (at 89).
October 1981)
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ber and public awareness increases as to possible implications asso-
ciated with close proximity to waste site and transport routes.
Readers will find particularly interesting the analytical framework
for assessing property value effects developed by Professor Hageman
which may be used in future research.
The third paper dealing with costs and risk minirhization is by
Quirk and Terasawa wherein the issue of regulation is taken up. Given
our limited expeience with away-from-source (reactor) storage of nu-
clear wastes-and that experience is essentially limited to low-level
wastes-one can only speculate as to the desirability of extensive li-
censing processes for waste sites, particularly in terms of NRC licen-
sing. Drawing from the U.S. experience with the nuclear power in-
dustry, Quirk and Terasawa address two related questions which are
relevant for nuclear waste management. First, what are the costs
associated with NRC licensing? Second, what do growth trends in the
nuclear power industry suggest in terms of the potential scope of the
nuclear waste disposal industry in the future? In terms of this first
question, there is little doubt that the federal regulatory process in-
volving the "practical value rule", environmental review processes,
and intervention processes, in addition to the safety-related regula-
tory processes of the NRC is costly in terms of time. In the mid-
1960s, an average of 5 years was required to complete the licensing
process for nuclear plants; by the early 1970s, the average time re-
quired to complete the licensing process increased to more than 12
years. While it is clear that such lengthy licensing-regulatory pro-
cesses impose large costs on applicants, it is not clear that the end re-
sult of the lengthier processes per se has necessarily made nuclar
plants safer. This is obviously relevant for the NWM issue of concern
in this volume and, as in earlier instances discussed above, methods
simply do not exist for assessing "benefits" from alternative licensing/
regulatory processes which could be used to choose optimal processes
wherein benefits are in some sense balanced with costs.
In terms of the future growth of the nuclear power industry and,
therefore, the potential future magnitude of the wage problem, Quirk
and Terasawa point to a number of factors aside from delays from
licensing processes which have resulted in a dramatic decline in new
applications for power plants. These include many-fold increases in
capital costs for nuclear plants (from $187/kw in the 1960s to $849-
$1,058/kw in the mid-1970s) and a deterioration in the nuclear in-
dustry's fuel cost advantage which has resulted from increases in the
cost of yellow cake from $6-$9/lb in the 1960s to $40-$45/lb in
the 1970s. To the extent that these trends continue, the scope of the
NWM problem (as related to growth in the nuclear industry) may be
correspondingly diminished.
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The Quirk-Terasawa discussion of licensing-regulatory issues in the
United States is extended to international issues in Dr. O'Brien's con-
tribution to this volume. Dr. O'Brien brings sharp focus to the prob-
lems associated with implementing the provisions of the 1979 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act which provides for the storage of nuclear
wastes under "effective international auspices and inspection" and
for appropriate compensation for the energy content of stored waste.
O'Brien identifies a number of problems associated with guaranteeing
a participant-country's access and control of jointly stored nuclear
wastes, as well as problems in obtaining agreement between partici-
pants as to the "desirability" of recovering the energy content of
stored waste (which then determines "appropriate compensation").
Looking to our experience with such international organizations as
the International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of The
European Communities, O'Brien offers suggestions for the structure
and composition of an international organization which might act as
an appropriate entity for the management of nuclear wastes under
international auspices.
The papers described above have as their central focus NWM pro-
grams that are preventative in nature-the issues of concern relate to
minimizing the risk of damages. A remaining question of considerable
importance is: what happens if nuclear waste transport or storage re-
sults in damage to the public-who is liable for the damages? Dr.
Linda Cohen addresses the liability issue as it is relevant for (among
others) two situations: unexpectedly expensive decommissioning
costs arise because of difficulties at the disposal site (premature
closure); damages arise due to adverse effects on public health. The
liability issue is made extraordinarily complex by the many actors
involved in the nuclear waste process: generators of waste (owners of
the nuclear power plant and, indirectly consumers of electricity), the
operator of the waste disposal facility, state governments and the
federal government. Dr. Cohen argues the need for all parties to face
full costs which provide effective financial incentives for optimal be-
havior: generators of waste should have incentives to minimize the
quantity and (radioactive) quality of wastes; storage site operators
should have incentives to uncover, report and treat waste-related
problems that pose health hazards to the public. As Dr. Cohen
acknowledges, however, the principle of using efficiency prices for
nuclear waste loses much of its appeal in efforts to implement pricing
programs for many reasons. Unexpected costs are just that, unex-
pected. Premature closing or health damage costs would likely involve
costs well in excess of set-aside funds; bonding and insurance options
are thought to be prohibitively expensive or unavailable. Most impor-
tantly, the site operator's incentives are to keep the site open-earning
October 1981]
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revenues. Reporting problems may lead to premature closure wherein
the operator's asset becomes a liability; certainly, reporting could be
expected to lead to higher bonding/insurance costs. Dr. Cohen offers
an interesting, multi-tiered arrangement for treating the liability prob-
lem within a context wherein incentives are preserved when possible.
In this scheme, the state insures the operator against liability and
some portion of revenue losses; the federal government insures the
states against losses in excess of some agreed upon amount, a la the
Price-Anderson Act. Implicitly, some portion of the costs associated
with this insurance scheme are passed on to producers of waste and
the electricity-consuming public. A method for structuring these
costs so as to provide incentives for producers of waste to "econo-
mize" on waste quantity and quality is an issue remaining for further
research.
Finally, research concerning NWM policies must unavoidably deal
with flows of consequences-benefits and costs-over time. Long per-
iods of time, multigenerational in nature, may be involved in con-
sidering potential health effects from stored wastes after decommis-
sioning of the site. Traditionally, flows of benefits and/or costs over
time are discounted so that all values are commenserable; future
values are expressed as present values. Professors Schulze, Brookshire
and Sandler consider the ethical implications of discounting benefits
and cost in evaluating nuclear waste options. The authors present a
fascinating discourse on a "consequentialist" approach for assessing
the ethical implications of the NWM options. Their arguments lead
them to an exploration, buttressed by a case study, of a "democratic"
approach for assessing NWM policies wherein procedural or process
considerations are given priority over efficiency considerations.
Under the democratic ethic, as the authors demonstrate, optimal
NWM strategies stress retrievability and monitoring possibilities so as
to preserve choice ("maneuverability") for future generations.
We hope the reader will find a nucleus of ideas which will assist in
setting the stage for future research concerning policy options related
to the management of nuclear wastes. Obviously, considerable re-
search remains for the development of methods which might be used
in assessing policies related to the protection of public health and
safety under the conditions of uncertainty which surround the NWM
issue. In this regard, as is stressed in the bulk of the papers included
in this volume, public perceptions of risk, and how such perceptions
might be affected, must be a primary consideration in the develop-
ment of these new assessment methods. In closing this Overview, we
offer the following observation by Weinberg which succinctly de-
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scribes the critical importance of public perceptions for policy for-
mulations related to the nuclear fuel cycle:
As I compare the issues we perceived during the infancy of nuclear
energy with those that have emerged during its maturity, the public
perception and acceptance of nuclear energy appears to be the ques-
tion that we missed rather badly .... This issue has emerged as the
most critical question concerning the future of nuclear energy.2"
20. Weinberg, The Maturity and Future of Nuclear Energy, 64 AMERICAN SCIENTIST
19 (1976).
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